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POLITICAL MARKET STRUCTURE

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ABSTRACT

Many political markets are essentially uncontested, in the sense that one candidate raises little (or no) money and consequently has little chance of election. This presents a puzzle in the presence of apparently low barriers to entry. Using a variant of Baron (1989) we provide a theory encompassing both contested and uncontested markets. The essential addition is the presence of fixed costs of campaigning. We show that these may be quite small and yet constitute decisive barriers to entry.

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Abstract

Many political markets are essentially uncontested, in the sense that one candidate raises little (or no) money and consequently has little chance of election. This presents a puzzle in the presence of apparently low barriers to entry. Using a variant of Baron (1989) we provide a theory encompassing both contested and uncontested markets. The essential addition is the presence of fixed costs of campaigning. We show that these may be quite small and yet constitute decisive barriers to entry.

Federal Election Commission data reveal two striking facts about the importance of money in politics. First, in both House and Senate races the candidate who raises the most money wins about 90 percent of the time. Second, while most races have multiple candidates, as many as 80 percent of races are essentially uncontested in the sense that one of the candidates raises little (or no) money and thus has no realistic chance of winning (Raskin and Bonifaz, 1994). Uncontested markets look like an important puzzle because political markets apparently have low barriers to entry. We offer a formal model of political market structure which explains why uncontested markets are so prevalent.¹

¹The notion of uncontested markets is distinct from the well-known notion of uncontestable markets.

We analyze the phenomenon of uncontested races by incorporating fixed costs of campaigning into a variant of Baron’s (1989) model of campaign contributions. Baron’s model is typically thought to be ill suited as a general model of political market structure since the model’s symmetry makes it most easily interpreted as a story of open seat races where there is no incumbent. This is unfortunate since open seat races are a small minority of all races: from 1960 through 1988 incumbents have sought reelection in approximately 90 percent of House races and 80 percent of Senate races (Magleby and Nelson, 1990).²

We show that if the candidate cannot raise enough contributions to cover the fixed cost of campaigning, entry is deterred. The actual threshold is higher than simply the fixed cost since contributions involve future costs to the successful candidate that must be balanced against the benefit of the money accepted in raising the candidate’s probability of election. The deterrence is self-reinforcing since lobbies will be reluctant to contribute to a candidate who raises a small amount of funds. Candidates who cannot obtain funds cannot sway enough voters to get elected, and only candidates who are likely to be elected can obtain funds. As we will show, this ‘Catch-22’ of electoral politics can operate even if the fixed cost threshold is quite low. As a result, we find that the introduction of a *small* fixed cost of campaigning substantially enriches the basic Baron model, allowing us to explain open-seat, incumbent/challenger, and single candidate (i.e., nearly unopposed) races.

We provide a thorough analysis of Nash equilibria in the political contributions game, characterizing both ‘interior’ Nash equilibria wherein multiple candidates actively

Fixed costs are a common element, but the contestable market idea emphasizes dynamics: the fixed cost is sunk in later periods and forward-looking investors will not commit the fixed cost if the incumbent firm will react with a price war.

²According to Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose (2000) open seat races have become somewhat more common in recent years.

campaign and also ‘corner’ equilibria wherein only one actively campaigns. In doing so we provide a more satisfactory treatment of the existence of interior Nash equilibrium than in Baron (1989) and Baron and Mo (1993). The Catch-22 feature can produce an uncontested market even with symmetric candidates and zero fixed costs due to a self-fulfilling prophecy—the candidate cannot raise any funds because no one expects her to win; consequently, she has no money to spend, which in turn ensures that she cannot win.³ We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of interior equilibria and derive the model’s comparative statics. The comparative statics imply that, the higher are fixed costs and the greater is the asymmetry between the candidates, the more likely is a corner solution.

Does our model plausibly explain the prevalence of uncontested races? The qualitative results of comparative static analysis cannot reply, so we turn to simulations to provide an answer to this question. We find that corner solutions are the *only* equilibria for much of the parameter range. For reasonable parameter values 30–60% of races only support a single active candidate. Thus, the simulations demonstrate that fixed costs can create an uncontested race between two otherwise identical candidates. In addition, we find that given other types of asymmetries between the candidates (say, initial popularity or campaign efficiency), single-candidate races emerge with very small fixed costs.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section of the paper briefly reviews some of the empirical literature on campaign spending in Federal elections which motivates our approach: money matters a lot, many challengers raise little money, and money is spent for some political service such as access. Section 2 sketches the model

³While such self-fulfilling belief equilibria are present in the basic Baron model, they are neither emphasized nor analyzed in Baron (1989).

of political competition that is reflected in these data. Section 3 contains our analysis of ‘interior’ Nash equilibria in the model in which both candidates actively campaign. We first characterize the conditions for the existence of interior Nash equilibria and establish conditions that guarantee when the interior equilibrium is unique. We then go on to discuss some comparative static results (e.g., how contributions change with respect to changes in the fixed costs of campaigning). Section 4 discusses ‘corner’ solution Nash equilibria in which only one candidate actively campaigns. In section 5 provide simulations and verify the important role of fixed costs in explaining the prevalence of single-candidate races.

1. Money and Elections

A substantial body of empirical research has been devoted to understanding the role played by campaign contributions in elections. These studies have identified a number of robust, stylized facts, several of which are most relevant for our model. First, the candidate who spends the most money wins the overwhelming majority of races. For instance, in 1992 86 percent of Senate candidates who outspent their opponent won the general election. In the same year, the bigger spender won 89 percent of House races (Raskin and Bonifaz, 1994).⁴

Moreover, this finding can not be simply attributed to an incumbency advantage. It is true that incumbents usually outspend challengers and also that incumbents win about 90 percent of the time (Magleby and Nelson, 1990). It must be noted, however, that even in open seat races the bigger spender wins almost 80 percent of House races (Raskin and Bonifaz, 1994). Thus, while incumbency seems to provide an additional

⁴While not reporting exact numbers, the discussion in Jacobsen (1978, 1980) and Abramowitz (1991) indicates that a similar relationship between money spent and outcomes existed during the 1970s and 1980s.

electoral benefit, it appears that chief among the many advantages of incumbency is the greater ability to raise funds.⁵

Second, many races are characterized by an extraordinary low level of competition and lopsided races are becoming increasingly prevalent over time (Jacobsen, 1987; Abramowitz, 1991). These races are essentially uncontested in the sense that the campaign contributions to the incumbent dwarf those to the challenger. And, as a result the challenger garners very few votes.⁶ According to Raskin and Bonifaz (1994) “in 1992, four out of five House incumbents faced either no challenger at all or a challenger with so little money—less than 50 percent the amount available to the incumbent—as to be deemed a non-serious competitor (p. 4).” Similarly, Westlye (1991) concludes that more than half of U.S. Senate races are foregone conclusions. Finally, Levitt (1998) shows that it is not uncommon for an incumbents to raise 100–200 times as much the money as the challenger. Levitt notes that it is precisely the races with extraordinary differences campaign budgets where the incumbent wins by more than 40 percentage points.

Third, access is a major—if not the primary—reason why lobbying groups make campaign contributions. Consider, for example, that more than two-thirds of multi-candidate PACs who make campaign contributions (those who contribute to more than one candidate) also have active lobbying offices in Washington (Sabato, 1984). Furthermore, Wright (1990) finds the House of Representatives’ voting decisions are best explained by lobbying contacts they received from each side of the issue. Once lobbying is controlled for, however, Wright finds little evidence that PAC contributions have a direct impact on voting. In other words, campaign contributions affect voting decisions

⁵Other advantages of holding office include greater name recognition, franking privileges, and larger staffs to provide constituent service.

⁶In 1986 and 1988 the incumbent won by more than 20 percentage points in more than 85% of House races (Abramowitz, 1991).

indirectly through lobbying. Snyder (1990, 1993) also finds support for the view that contributions buy access. In his model contributions buy an asset which takes the form of a contingent claim. Applying efficiency conditions on candidate and lobby behavior, Snyder is able to derive relationships among key variables such as total contributions, the value of such contributions, and election outcomes. Using data from U.S. House and Senate Snyder uses these equilibrium conditions to estimate implications of the model and finds support for the notion of contributions as investments.⁷

2. The Model

Following Baron (1989) we consider a model with two politicians who simultaneously advertise and campaign (a set of activities we collectively call ‘effort’) in order to sway rationally ignorant voters. For convenience we will refer to one candidate as the ‘incumbent’ and the other as the ‘challenger.’ The labels merely point to potential asymmetry in favor of the incumbent, neither implying nor ruling out that one of the candidates already holds office.

The objective probability of candidate i being elected is assumed to be equal to

$$p = \frac{\mu e_i^\beta}{\mu e_i^\beta + (1 - \mu) e_c^\beta}, \quad \beta < 1, \quad 0 < \mu < 1 \quad (1)$$

where e denotes candidate effort. The indices i and c refer to the incumbent and challenger, respectively. The parameter $\beta < 1$ implies that there is diminishing marginal effectiveness to effort. The parameter μ captures the potential asymmetry of relative effort levels: for equal efforts, $e_i/e_c = 1$, $p = \mu$. Effort is comprised of an exogenous

⁷Other studies that find support for the access interpretation of PAC contributions include Grier and Munger (1991a,b), Hall and Wayman (1990), McCarty and Rothenberg (1996), Milyo (1997a,b), Romer and Snyder (1994), and Snyder (1991, 1992).

component $\bar{e} \geq 0$ representing ideological attachment or sunk effort and an endogenous component E which must be financed by the candidate. Overall campaign effort, therefore, can be written $e_j = \bar{e}_j + E_j$; $j = i, c$.

Candidate j , $j = i, c$ finances her campaign by accepting H_j contributions from a large set of potential contributors. The contributions have value to the politician because they allow her to buy advertising (or more broadly, exert ‘effort’) that increases her probability of election.⁸ The cost of campaigning is

$$C_j = K_j + b_j E_j, \quad j = i, c,$$

where E_j is the endogenous portion of candidate effort, K_j is the fixed cost of campaigning, and b_j is the marginal cost. $E_j > 0$ requires $C_j > K_j$. The fixed cost represents a threshold ability to spend which must be met to hire a campaign manager (who must be convinced that the campaign has some reasonable chance of success), rent an office and so forth. Solving for E_j , $E_j = (C_j - K_j)/b_j$.

Each candidate obtains money to finance her campaign from donors. Our view is that money is exchanged for access, called influence here to emphasize its strategic potential. To capture this interpretation, we assume that each active donor purchases one unit of access, rationalized as ‘buying’ an option on the elected official’s future time, whereby she implicitly promises to listen, possibly read a position paper, give a reasoned response to the donor, etc.⁹ Lobbies value access as an opportunity to get the politician to process costly (to the politician) information, expecting that the information may alter the politician’s behavior favorably. The information must be created at some

⁸In the U.S. system, campaign contributions cannot be converted to personal income.

⁹The amounts typically donated are consistent with this notion of purchasing some hours of time of the politician and her staff. Empirically, the median value of contributions is around \$1500, far below the FEC limit of \$10,000 for a House race and \$25,000 for a Senate race.

additional cost (e.g., preparing the report, taking polls), and the signal value of the lobby's information is based on its verifiable production cost.¹⁰ The interpretation offered here need not include the idea of 'buying' the politician's vote, or even buying a lottery ticket to the politician's vote. The main idea is more palatable: political information processing is costly, and a price system arises in politics to allocate resources to this task.

Critically, we assume that access must be purchased prior to its use. This seems to fit casual empiricism.¹¹ There are also solid theoretical grounds for the assumed structure. Incumbent politicians who are thought to allow access at the donors' convenience will be unable to raise funds, save as in payment for service. This may yield lower revenue since a much smaller group of clients will pay. Moreover, with a small group of clients the payment may be negotiated on less favorable terms, since the situation tends toward bilateral monopoly. Finally, the payment for service type of behavior may lead to an advantage to the politician's rival if it is publicized.¹²

The value of access to the donor is private information, and heterogeneity creates an extensive margin, leading to downward sloping, concave demand, $v(H_j)$. Since politicians do not know the value of access to individuals, they cannot price discriminate.

¹⁰Austen-Smith (1995) has critiqued the access story because a lobby will only be believed if it has coincident interest to the politician, in which case the lobby need not pay for access. He bases a rationale for the access model in a rational choice signaling game in which the politician is uncertain about the lobby's interest. This is unnecessarily complicated in our view since the cost of creating the signal is like a performance bond, wherein lies can be uncovered by the politician's effort but result in loss of the bond to the lobby. We also think that reputation is important in providing credibility on both sides of the information exchange between lobbies and politicians.

¹¹The post-1994 election offer by the Congressional Republicans to allow those who did not contribute previously to make contributions to an elections debt repayment fund seems exceptional. It is nevertheless difficult to believe that access was granted to latecomers on the same basis as the early birds.

¹²The offer to late-comers of the previous footnote may maintain the credibility of normally denying access due to the surprise of the shift in control of Congress to the Republicans.

Thus all contributions to a single politician are at the same rate.¹³

If elected, each candidate faces some chance of having to grant access to those to whom it was sold. For simplicity, we assume there is a probability π of having to grant access to the entire group (each contributor subsequently receives a realization of a random iid process determining exercise of the option to access). The *ex ante* value (to the donor) of the exchange depends on the probability of the candidate being elected, which is taken as exogenous by the donor, but must be rational in equilibrium. Hence, the *ex ante* price for access is $p\pi v(H_i)$ for the incumbent and $[1 - p]\pi v(H_c)$ for the challenger. Substituting we can express endogenous effort as

$$E_i(H_i) = [p\pi v(H_i)H_i - K_i]/b_i, \quad (2)$$

$$E_c(H_c) = [(1 - p)\pi v(H_c)H_c - K_c]/b_c. \quad (3)$$

Given this setup, we show in the appendix that the probability that the incumbent is elected can be expressed as a reduced form correspondence, i.e., $p = P(H_i, H_c, K_i, K_c)$. In the appendix we also establish a condition that guarantees the uniqueness of the probability p for a given (H_i, H_c, K_i, K_c) . The same condition also guarantees $P_{H_i} > 0$, $P_{H_c} < 0$, $P_{K_i} < 0$, $P_{K_c} > 0$. Loosely speaking, this condition requires the fixed costs of campaigning be relatively small relative to exogenous effort. Intuitively, the condition means that if exogenous campaign effort is large enough, a candidate will campaign even without raising campaign funds. By contrast, in Baron's model there are always multiple solutions for p given (H_i, H_c, K_i, K_c) .

Politicians do not sell unbounded amounts of access because it is costly for a politician to listen to a petitioner's case: staff time and the politician's own time must be

¹³Uniform contributions rates are counterfactual and the observed price dispersion implies that politicians do know the value of access in some cases. Uniformity is a harmless simplification nonetheless.

diverted from other business. If access is granted, $\Omega(H_i)$ is the cost to the incumbent and $\Gamma(H_c)$ is the cost to the challenger. The cost functions are increasing and convex in the number of units of access sold due to each politician's limited capacity to handle access. If we let W denote the value of being elected, we can write the expected utility of the (risk neutral) candidate as

$$\begin{aligned}\psi^i &= [W - \pi\Omega(H_i)]P(H_i, H_c, K_i, K_c), \\ \psi^c &= [W - \pi\Gamma(H_c)][1 - P(H_i, H_c, K_i, K_c)].\end{aligned}$$

3. Nash equilibria of contested races

Each candidate maximizes her expected utility with respect to the number of units of access she sells. The first order conditions for an interior solution to each candidate's maximization problem are

$$\psi_{H_i}^i = [W - \pi\Omega(H_i)]P_{H_i} - P(\cdot)\pi\Omega'(H_i) = 0, \quad (4)$$

$$\psi_{H_c}^c = -[W - \pi\Gamma(H_c)]P_{H_c} - [1 - P(\cdot)]\pi\Gamma'(H_c) = 0, \quad (5)$$

where we use subscripts to denote derivatives.

We will assume that the second order conditions $\psi_{H_j H_j}^j < 0$, $j = i, c$ are satisfied.¹⁴ An interior Nash equilibrium of the contributions game exists if (4) and (5) are satisfied when evaluated at the pair $(H_i^N > 0, H_c^N > 0)$.

3.1. Symmetric candidates

While an interior Nash equilibrium need not exist, we can show that

¹⁴Sufficient conditions are provided in the Appendix.

Proposition 1 *A symmetric interior Nash equilibrium always exists when the candidates are symmetric and there are no fixed costs of campaigning and no exogenous campaign effort.*

For contested races, we are also interested in how one candidate responds to a change in contributions by the rival candidate. Does an increase in the rival's contributions lead the competing candidate to accept more or less contributions? We can show that

Proposition 2 *When the candidates are symmetric and there are no fixed costs of campaigning and no exogenous campaign effort, the candidates' contributions are strategic complements near the symmetric Nash equilibrium.*

In other words, $\psi_{H_i H_c}^i > 0$ and $\psi_{H_c H_i}^c > 0$, which means that higher contributions by the rival raise the marginal profitability of own contributions, entailing a rise in own contributions to restore the first order condition. The best response functions are thus upward sloping in H_c - H_i space.

3.2. Comparative statics

Fixed costs

Candidates are likely have different fixed costs of campaigning. This will affect the number of contributions that each accepts. Specifically, a rise in K_j , $j = i, c$ changes the interior equilibrium (H_i, H_c) according to

$$\begin{pmatrix} \frac{dH_i}{dK_j} \\ \frac{dH_c}{dK_j} \end{pmatrix} = \frac{1}{D} \begin{pmatrix} -\psi_{H_c H_c}^c & \psi_{H_i H_c}^i \\ \psi_{H_c H_i}^c & -\psi_{H_i H_i}^i \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \psi_{H_i K_j}^i \\ \psi_{H_c K_j}^c \end{pmatrix}, \quad j = i, c,$$

where stability implies $D = \psi_{H_c H_c}^c \psi_{H_i H_i}^i - \psi_{H_i H_c}^i \psi_{H_c H_i}^c > 0$.¹⁵ It follows that

Proposition 3 *Near the symmetric Nash equilibrium,*

$$\frac{dH_j}{dK_j} > 0, \quad j = i, c,$$

$$\frac{dH_k}{dK_j} > 0, \quad k, j = i, c; \quad k \neq j$$

In other words, starting from the symmetric equilibrium an increase in fixed costs leads to more contributions by both candidates.

Changes in the fixed cost of campaigning also has a direct effect on candidate utility. In particular,

Proposition 4 *Near the symmetric Nash equilibrium, an increase in (own) fixed cost lowers a candidate's utility and raises the utility of the rival candidate.*

Cost of access

Suppose that the incumbent is more efficient at providing access, perhaps reflecting the advantage of experience or innate capacity, e.g., $\Gamma'(H) > \Omega'(H)$. This asymmetry acts to increase H_i relative to H_c by shifting up the incumbent's best response function. Intuitively, the incumbent can anticipate less marginal effort in providing access, hence is able to accept more contributions, other things held equal. Strategic complementarity implies that the challenger must then also supply more access in equilibrium.

¹⁵The conditions which guarantee strategic complementarity also imply stability.

Recognition

The incumbent plausibly has a built-in advantage in that $\mu > 1/2$ due to voters' familiarity or campaign experience. Raising μ translates to a parametric rise in $P(\cdot)$. This has an ambiguous effect on the reaction functions and hence contribution levels. In the region where $P(\cdot)$ is greater than or equal to $1/2$, the effect is to lower the incumbent's contribution level while it may raise or lower the challenger's contribution level. In the region where $P(\cdot)$ is less than $1/2$, the effect is to raise the challenger's contribution level while the effect on the incumbent is ambiguous.

Value of access

A rise in the value of access can be parameterized as a multiplicative shift upward in $v(H)$. Such a shift has no effect on the elasticity given H , and is readily seen to increase the marginal benefit of contributions in both first order conditions. Thus the Nash equilibrium number (and dollar amount) of contributions will rise for both challenger and incumbent.

4. Corner Solution Nash Equilibria

Interior Nash equilibrium will not exist when candidates are sufficiently asymmetric. In these cases, the dominant candidate is the only active campaigner and Nash equilibrium is found at one corner (i.e., either $H_c = 0$ or $H_i = 0$). A candidate will refrain from active campaigning if she earns less utility in the interior Nash equilibrium than the reservation utility she receives by not actively campaigning.

The corner solution is more likely the more asymmetric are the candidates. For instance, the larger are the challenger's fixed costs relative to the incumbent's fixed

costs, the less likely it is that an interior Nash equilibrium will exist. That is,

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{d\psi^i}{dK_c} &= [W - \pi\Omega] \left(P_{K_c} + P_{H_c} \frac{dH_c}{dK_c} \right) = [W - \pi\Omega] \left[\frac{dP}{dK_c} \right]_{H_i^N} > 0, \\ \frac{d\psi^c}{dK_c} &= -[W - \pi\Gamma] \left(P_{K_c} + P_{H_i} \frac{dH_i}{dK_c} \right) = -[W - \pi\Omega] \left[\frac{dP}{dK_c} \right]_{H_c^N} < 0.\end{aligned}$$

Even if an interior Nash equilibrium exists, there may be corner solution equilibria, in which either the challenger or the incumbent does not actively campaign. These arise, oversimplifying, when the electorate thinks one or the other politician has little chance. Because the *value* of access depends on the probability of election, a politician may be able to sell access, but will realize very little money from these sales and hence will be unable to afford to campaign. As a result, the electorate's original assessment that the candidate has a slim chance is self-fulfilling. As we discuss below, this view is oversimplified because a politician who does raise campaign funds may still have a chance of winning due to the presence of exogenous effort.

More formally, if predetermined (or party) support is sufficiently small so that $\bar{e}_j - K_j < 0$, $j = i, c$, there always exists a pair of self-fulfilling prophecy corner solutions. In this case, in order to begin to improve her chances of election a candidate must make a discrete leap to a level of contributions sufficient to offset this fixed cost. Each potential donor may not believe a sufficient number of others will support the candidate, so a coordination failure among the donors and the politician will prevent entry. Thus, a Nash equilibrium will exist at either corner. However, a corner solution will not be a 'global' Nash equilibrium if an interior solution also exists. In this case, the interior solution dominates for the excluded candidate and the corner solution dominates for the other candidate.¹⁶

¹⁶When both interior and corner solutions exist, we prefer to think of the corner solution as a 'local'

We note that the self-fulfilling prophecy corner solution may not exist. Fixed costs and exogenous effort are the two key ingredients in determining whether these corner equilibria exist. If predetermined (or party) support is large relative to fixed costs, $\bar{e}_j - K_j > 0$, $j = i, c$, the politician will be viable so that even a small number of sales of access are worthwhile to both the candidate and the lobbies. In this case, the initial beliefs of the electorate do not determine the outcome and we will have an interior equilibrium. For instance, a wealthy candidate may be able to “self-finance” her campaign (i.e., has a very large \bar{e}) and therefore have a very good chance despite selling no access.

The preceding discussion has analytically characterized the equilibria in a generalized Baron model of campaign access. We have shown that interior equilibria exist when the candidates are not too different and that such equilibria may disappear when we allow the candidates to differ. Therefore, this generalization is potentially a much more satisfying characterization of campaign competition since many races are essentially uncontested. While our discussion emphasized the importance of fixed costs in determining whether or not a race is contested, intuitively it is clear that any asymmetries will make corner solutions more likely. Qualitative analysis cannot, however, quantify the likelihood of observing corner solutions.

5. Simulation Results

We now use simulation techniques to show how asymmetries can create uncontested campaigns and to quantify how different the candidates must be before interior solutions disappear (i.e., before races become uncontested). Our answer is, not much. We also

Nash equilibrium since moving from the corner implies non-myopic behavior on the part of the *lobbies* as well as the politicians.

investigate how fixed costs interact with small asymmetries to make interior solutions disappear. Relatively small fixed costs make for corner solutions. Overall, the results indicate that the Baron model with fixed costs is quite plausibly an explanation of a the large proportion of corner solutions.

In order to simulate the model, we write the value of access as

$$v(H_j) = v_0 H_j^\alpha, \quad j = i, c; \quad -1 < \alpha < 0.$$

We also suppose that the cost of providing access can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} \Omega(H_i) &= H_i^{\delta_i}, \quad \delta_i > 1, \\ \Gamma(H_c) &= H_c^{\delta_c}, \quad \delta_c > 1. \end{aligned}$$

Substituting, we can solve for campaign effort as

$$\begin{aligned} e_i &= \max \left\{ 0, \frac{p\pi v_0 H_i^{\alpha+1} - K_i}{b_i} \right\} + \bar{e}_i \\ e_c &= \max \left\{ 0, \frac{(1-p)\pi v_0 H_c^{\alpha+1} - K_c}{b_c} \right\} + \bar{e}_c. \end{aligned}$$

As discussed above, the key determinant for whether both candidates actively sell access is the relative size of exogenous effort and fixed costs. It is convenient, therefore, for us to normalize exogenous effort to zero and measure fixed costs relative to $\bar{e}_i = \bar{e}_c = 0$. The size of fixed costs is to be understood in our simulations relative to the value of office W , the value of access parameters v_0 and α , and the cost of access parameter, δ . For this purpose it is very useful to focus on the minimum value of contributions H^{\min} needed to obtain positive effort, and on the utility enjoyed at that minimum level of

contributions. For the incumbent, for a given probability of election p , we have

$$H_i^{\min} = \left(\frac{K_i}{p\pi v_0} \right)^{1/(1+\alpha)}.$$

The expected utility of the incumbent at H^{\min} is

$$p \left[W - \left(\frac{K_i}{p\pi v_0} \right)^{\delta_i/(1+\alpha)} \right].$$

Assuming a reservation utility of zero, if expected utility is less than or equal to zero at H^{\min} , entry is impossible. Solving for the value of K_i which just makes expected utility equal to zero, we have $K_i^{\max} = p\pi v_0 W^{(1+\alpha)/\delta_i}$.

In simulating the model we chose parameter values in part so that the fixed costs are small in the sense that K_i/K_i^{\max} is small.¹⁷ If fixed costs are close to K_i^{\max} and $K_c > K_i$, then it is very difficult for the challenger to be considered viable, even if the candidates are symmetric in all other respects. Hence, the challenger will have a very difficult time raising money. We believe this is not a particularly compelling scenario since the explanation for uncontested races would simply be large fixed costs. In contrast, when the incumbent's fixed costs are small, the mere presence of fixed costs does not obviously give rise to uncontested races.

In the simulations presented below, we assume that candidates are symmetric in most respects. For instance, we assume they are similar in their ability to provide access (i.e., $\delta_i = \delta_c = 2$) and in their marginal cost of campaign effort (i.e., $b_i = b_c = 1$). We also assume $\beta = 0.5$, $\pi = 0.3$, and the value of being elected is $W = 10,000$. Finally, we assume that the value of access without any congestion from other buyers is $v_0 = 70$.

In our simulations we characterize whether the campaign is contested as the other

¹⁷Similar methods characterize what it means for K_c to be small.

key parameters in the model vary. We consider two alternative values for the elasticity of the value of access, $\alpha = \{-0.7, -0.9\}$ and two sizes of the incumbent's fixed costs, $K_i = \{1, 3\}$. Given this parameterization the smallest value of K_i^{\max} implied is $21p10^{0.2}$, which implies that the *largest* value of K_i/K_i^{\max} used in our simulations is equal to 0.09p. This is a deliberately extreme small value for the incumbent's fixed costs, one which gives a deliberately large share of the parameter space in which contested races can emerge in equilibrium.¹⁸

In Figures 1 and 2 we depict our simulation results. On the x -axis we measure the candidates relative ex ante prospects. As will become clear, it is convenient to normalize the metric as $\omega = (1 - \mu)/\mu$. Without loss of generality we assume that $\mu \geq 1/2$.¹⁹ When the two candidates have the same ex ante probability of winning (i.e., $\mu = 1/2$), $\omega = 1$. As the incumbent is increasingly favored by the electorate, (i.e., μ increases), ω falls. In the limit, when the incumbent is guaranteed a victory ($\mu = 1$), $\omega = 0$. Thus, the ω should be interpreted as a measure of the challenger's initial prospects.

On the y -axis we measure the *relative* fixed costs, $\kappa = K_i/K_c$. It is reasonable to assume that the challenger has at least as large fixed costs as the incumbent, $K_c \geq K_i$. As the challenger is burdened with larger and larger fixed costs κ falls. Thus, in the figures at the point ($\omega = 1, \kappa = 1$) the candidates are completely symmetric. As we move to the southwest the candidates become increasingly dissimilar or asymmetric.

In each of the figures we report whether in our simulations the race is contested. For each set of parameter values we plot a line that divides the box into two subspaces. The region above the plotted line contains parameter values which support a contested

¹⁸If the equilibrium probability for contested races is around 1/2, the ratio $K_i/K_i^{\max} < 1/5$. In other words, the largest fixed costs considered in our simulations is less than one-fifth of the value which would preclude entry.

¹⁹It seems sensible that at the time the campaign begins the incumbent would be at least as likely to win as the challenger.

equilibrium. The region below contains parameter values for which only corner solutions exist.

We begin by looking at Figure 1 where we set $K_i = 1$. In the figure we contrast the solutions for two different values of α , the elasticity of the value of access, which is best interpreted as a congestion externality. In other words, the value of access to a given lobby decreases as in the number of lobbies seeking access.

The figure highlights several key insights. First, the more similar are the candidates, the more likely will races be contested. That is, for parameter values in northeast region (i.e., high ω and high κ), races are contested. For parameter values in southwest region (i.e., low ω and low κ), races are uncontested. This is consistent with the empirical finding the uncontested races tend to occur in the same House district year after year where a popular incumbent runs year after year; conversely, landslide victories rarely occur in open seat races, where the candidates are far more likely to be viewed as ex ante similar by the electorate (Gierzynski, 2000).

Second, for a given value of relative fixed costs, races are more likely to be uncontested the larger is the incumbent's ex ante advantage (i.e., the higher is μ). When relative fixed costs are sufficiently different, even races where the candidates have identical ex ante prospects ($\mu = 1/2$ or $\omega = 1$) are uncontested. Conversely, for a given value of μ , races are more likely to be uncontested the larger are challenger's fixed costs. And, when the incumbent is sufficiently favored (μ is large), even races where the candidates have identical fixed costs are uncontested.

Third, as we vary the parameter characterizing the elasticity of the value of access, the likelihood of contested races changes. In the figure we depict two values for the elasticity, one where the congestion externality is relatively low ($\alpha = -0.7$) and one where the congestion externality is relatively high ($\alpha = -0.9$). We find that the higher

the congestion effect, the more difficult it will be for the challenger to raise funds. The reason: a high congestion externality reduces the value to contributing. This exacerbates the incumbent's advantages of relatively low fixed costs and high initial favorability. As a result, the challenger finds herself unable to raise funds. In our example, the fraction of parameter space involving uncontested races jumps from 28% to 54% when the congestion externality increases. Of course, the exact percentage of uncontested races depends on the precise parameter values, but the lesson is clear: the role of fixed costs is magnified when the candidates differ in other dimensions. And, this means our variant of the Baron model can plausibly explain the high frequency of uncontested House and Senate races.

Figure 2 highlights that the level of fixed costs, not just their relative magnitudes, influence the type of outcomes observed. In this figure we hold the congestion externality constant ($\alpha = -0.7$) but we now let the size of the incumbent's fixed cost be either low ($K_i = 1$) or higher ($K_i = 3$).²⁰ On the y -axis we continue to depict the candidates' relative fixed costs, κ , and assume that the challenger has at least as large fixed costs as the incumbent.

Once again, the model generates predictions that are consistent with empirical findings. First, just as we saw in Figure 1, the more similar are the candidates, the more likely will the races be contested. In other words, parameter values in the northeast region give rise to contested races while those in the southwest give rise to uncontested races. Second, differences between the candidates become increasingly important the higher are fixed costs. In particular, for a given κ , the lower are the incumbent's fixed costs the larger μ must be before a race is uncontested. In simple terms, the lower are fixed costs, the more likely will races be contested. In our simulation, the fraction of

²⁰We once again emphasize that $K_i = 3$ is still small relative to W and v_0 .

parameter space involving uncontested races goes from 28% to 55% when fixed costs increase. We emphasize that even the higher value of fixed costs is ‘small’ relative to the value of office and the revenue of the first units of access sold. Or, put another way, the expected utility at the minimum level of H is large so it is not unreasonable to expect challengers to contest the race. Nonetheless, the simulations reveal that even small fixed costs can generate uncontested races.

Taking Figure 1 and 2 together, the simulations confirm that a generalization of the Baron model of electoral competition can generate competition patterns consistent with the empirical observation that a large number of campaign races are uncontested.

6. Concluding Comments

In this paper we offer a generalization of Baron’s (1989) model of electoral competition. By introducing fixed costs and exogenous campaign effort, we show that a Baron-type formulation can generate predictions consistent with observed patterns of electoral competition: namely, only one candidate reports significant PAC contributions in many House and Senate races.

The fixed cost of campaigning allows a role for strategic play in two dimensions. First, the expenditure of initial funds (or what we refer to as exogenous effort) raises the perceived probability of reelection and hence the price at which access may be sold subsequently to PACs. It thus confers an advantage in the subsequent contributions competition with a rival. Second, there is the war chest effect: strategic accumulation of campaign contributions to deter entry of serious challengers. Third, party-level contributions can potentially serve to stimulate PAC contributions. That is, party contributions can make a weak candidate viable, and by doing so “prime the pump” so that

non-party PACs find it worthwhile to contribute. In a companion paper (Anderson and Prusa, 2001) we analyze these issues in greater detail.

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Appendix

The Reduced Form Probability Function

The model implies that the probability depends on effort, while effort depends on the probability. Further analysis requires a reduced form solution for the probability in terms of (H_i, H_c, K_i, K_c) .

Using the expressions for (1), (2), and (3), total candidate effort is given by:

$$e_i = \begin{cases} \bar{e}_i + [p\pi v(H_i)H_i - K_i]/b_i & \text{if } p\pi v(H_i)H_i - K_i \geq 0, \\ \bar{e}_i & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$e_c = \begin{cases} \bar{e}_c + [(1-p)\pi v(H_c)H_c - K_c]/b_c & \text{if } (1-p)\pi v(H_c)H_c - K_c \geq 0, \\ \bar{e}_c & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

For an interior solution, we can obtain the reduced form by dividing the numerator and denominator of (1) by μe_i^β and substituting effort levels. The rational expectations equilibrium condition is

$$p = g(p, H_i, H_c, K_i, K_c) = \frac{1}{1 + \omega \left(\frac{b_c \bar{e}_c + (1-p)\pi v(H_c)H_c - K_c}{b_i \bar{e}_i + p\pi v(H_i)H_i - K_i} \right)^\beta} . \quad (\text{A.1})$$

where $\omega = \frac{1-\mu}{\mu} \left(\frac{b_i}{b_c} \right)^\beta$. The reduced form probability function is

$$P(H_i, H_c, K_i, K_c) = \{p : p = g(p, H_i, H_c, K_i, K_c)\}.$$

Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium Probability

Existence of the fixed point solution of the equation defining $P(\cdot)$ can be guaranteed

but uniqueness obtains only with restrictions. As for existence, so long as at least one candidate campaigns actively we show that $1 > g(1, \cdot) > g(0, \cdot) > 0$. Since $g(p, \cdot)$ is continuous on the unit interval, it must cross the 45 degree line satisfying $p = g(p, \cdot)$ somewhere in the unit interval, hence a fixed point exists.

There is a technical complication in the positive effort requirement. To simplify notation define $\underline{p} = K_i/[v(H_i)H_i]$, $\bar{p} = 1 - K_c/[v(H_c)H_c]$.

For H_i and H_c both small (i.e., $p\pi v(H_i)H_i - K_i \leq 0$ and $(1-p)\pi v(H_c)H_c - K_c \leq 0$), neither campaign is active and

$$g(p, H_i, H_c, K_i, K_c) = 1/[1 + \omega (b_c \bar{e}_c / b_i \bar{e}_i)^\beta] \quad \text{for all } p. \quad (\text{A.2})$$

For H_c small we have

$$g(p, H_i, H_c, K_i, K_c) = \begin{cases} 1/[1 + \omega (\bar{e}_c / \bar{e}_i)^\beta] & \text{if } p \leq \underline{p}, \\ 1/[1 + \omega (\bar{e}_c / e_i)^\beta] & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

For H_c and H_i both sufficiently large we have

$$g(p, H_i, H_c, K_i, K_c) = \begin{cases} 1/[1 + \omega (e_c / \bar{e}_i)^\beta] & \text{if } p \leq \underline{p}, \\ 1/[1 + \omega (e_c / e_i)^\beta] & \text{if } \underline{p} < p < \bar{p}, \\ 1/[1 + \omega (\bar{e}_c / e_i)^\beta] & \text{if } p > \bar{p}. \end{cases}$$

It is straightforward to show that $1 > g(1) > g(\bar{p}) > g(\underline{p}) > g(0) > 0$ and $g(p)$ is continuous on the unit interval, as claimed.

The fixed point solution p need not be unique. Uniqueness follows if $g_p < 1$ for

$p \in [0, 1]$. Differentiating $g(p, \cdot)$ in the interval $\underline{p} < p < \bar{p}$

$$g_p(p, \cdot) = \beta g(1 - g)(A_c + A_i) \geq 0,$$

where

$$A_c \equiv \frac{v(H_c)H_c}{b_c\bar{e}_c + (1 - p)v(H_c)H_c - K_c} \geq 0$$

$$A_i \equiv \frac{v(H_i)H_i}{b_i\bar{e}_i + pv(H_i)H_i - K_i} \geq 0.$$

For $p < \underline{p}$, A_c disappears and for $p > \bar{p}$, A_i disappears. Examining the expression for g_p , uniqueness cannot generally be guaranteed, since $A_c + A_i$ can exceed one by enough to offset the influence of the first three terms. For large $v(H_c)H_c$ and $v(H_i)H_i$, at equilibrium $p = g$, g_p and converges to β . As $v(H_c)H_c$ and $v(H_i)H_i$ fall, their effect on g_p is signed by

$$\frac{\partial A_c}{\partial H_c} = A_c \frac{b_c\bar{e}_c - K_c}{H_c[b_c\bar{e}_c + (1 - p)v(H_c)H_c - K_c]}(1 - 1/\varepsilon_c)$$

$$\frac{\partial A_i}{\partial H_i} = A_i \frac{b_i\bar{e}_i - K_i}{H_i[b_i\bar{e}_i + pv(H_i)H_i - K_i]}(1 - 1/\varepsilon_i),$$

where the elasticities are defined as

$$\varepsilon_i \equiv -v(H_i)/[v'(H_i)H_i] > 1$$

$$\varepsilon_c \equiv -v(H_c)/[v'(H_c)H_c] > 1$$

$A_c + A_i$ falls with contributions as $b_i\bar{e}_i - K_i > 0$ and $b_c\bar{e}_c - K_c > 0$. $A_c + A_i$ rises with contributions as $b_i\bar{e}_i - K_i < 0$ and $b_c\bar{e}_c - K_c < 0$.

Therefore a sufficient condition for uniqueness is $\beta < 1$, $b_i \bar{e}_i - K_i > 0$ and $b_c \bar{e}_c - K_c > 0$.

Comparative Statics of the Probability Function

We now consider the comparative statics of the equilibrium probability $P(H_i, H_c, K_i, K_c)$. We will show that the incumbent's probability is increasing in her own contributions and decreasing in the rival's contributions, assuming the uniqueness condition discussed above is satisfied.

Differentiating $P(\cdot)$ with respect to H_i ,

$$P_{H_i} = \frac{g_{H_i}}{1 - g_p} > 0,$$

where

$$g_{H_i} = \beta g(1 - g) \frac{pv(H_i)(1 - 1/\varepsilon_i)}{b_i \bar{e}_i + pv(H_i)H_i - K_i} > 0.$$

The denominator is positive while the numerator is positive for the portion of the inverse demand curve for which revenue is increasing in sales.

Differentiating $P(\cdot)$ with respect to H_c ,

$$P_{H_c} = \frac{g_{H_c}}{1 - g_p} < 0$$

since

$$g_{H_c} = -\beta g(1 - g) \frac{(1 - p)v(H_c)(1 - 1/\varepsilon_c)}{b_c \bar{e}_c + (1 - p)v(H_c)H_c - K_c} < 0.$$

As for the fixed costs, we anticipate that the incumbent's probability is decreasing in her own fixed costs and increasing in rival's fixed costs. The fixed costs affect $P(\cdot)$

as follows

$$\begin{aligned}
P_{K_i} &= \frac{g_{K_i}}{1 - g_p} < 0 \\
P_{K_c} &= \frac{g_{K_c}}{1 - g_p} > 0 \\
g_{K_i} &= -\beta g(1 - g) \frac{1}{b_i \bar{e}_i + p\pi v(H_i)H_i - K_i} < 0 \\
g_{K_c} &= \beta g(1 - g) \frac{1}{b_c \bar{e}_c + (1 - p)\pi v(H_c)H_c - K_c} > 0.
\end{aligned}$$

The second derivatives of the reduced form probability function are needed to evaluate the comparative statics of the Nash equilibrium in the contributions game. From the analysis of the Nash game interior solution we know that $P_{H_i K_i} > 0$ is a sufficient condition for a rise in K_i to shift the incumbent's offer of H_i upward for any value of H_c , i.e., $dH_i/dK_i > 0$ while maintaining the marginal profit condition for the incumbent. Evaluating the necessary second derivative of $P(\cdot)$:

$$\begin{aligned}
P_{H_i K_i} &= P_{H_i} \left[\frac{g_{H_i p} P_{K_i} + g_{H_i K_i}}{g_{H_i}} + \frac{g_{pp} P_{K_i} + g_p K_i}{1 - g_p} \right], \\
P_{H_c K_i} &= P_{H_c} \left[\frac{g_{H_c p} P_{K_i} + g_{H_c K_i}}{g_{H_c}} + \frac{g_{pp} P_{K_i} + g_p K_i}{1 - g_p} \right]
\end{aligned}$$

The analysis of conditions for strategic complementarity requires evaluation of

$$P_{H_i H_c} = P_{H_i} \left[\frac{g_{H_i p} P_{H_c} + g_{H_i H_c}}{g_{H_i}} + \frac{g_{pp} P_{H_c} + g_p H_c}{1 - g_p} \right].$$

The second order condition for interior utility maximization requires evaluation of

$$P_{H_i H_i} = P_{H_i} \left[\frac{g_{H_i p} P_{H_i} + g_{H_i H_i}}{g_{H_i}} + \frac{g_{pp} P_{H_i} + g_p H_i}{1 - g_p} \right].$$

Evaluation of the expressions in brackets requires evaluation of the second derivatives of $g(\cdot)$.

$$\begin{aligned}
g_{H_i p} &= g_{p H_i} = g_p \left[\frac{1-2g}{g(1-g)} g_{H_i} + \frac{\partial A_i / \partial H_i}{A_c + A_i} \right] < 0, \text{ for } g \geq 1/2, \bar{e}_i - K_i < 0. \\
g_{H_c p} &= g_{p H_c} = g_p \left[\frac{1-2g}{g(1-g)} g_{H_c} + \frac{\partial A_c / \partial H_c}{A_c + A_i} \right] > 0, \text{ for } g \geq 1/2, \bar{e}_c - K_c > 0. \\
g_{H_i K_i} &= g_{H_i} \left[\frac{1-2g}{g(1-g)} g_{K_i} + \frac{1}{\bar{e}_i + p\pi v(H_i)H_i - K_i} \right] > 0, \text{ for } g \geq 1/2. \\
g_{H_c K_i} &= g_{H_c} \left[\frac{1-2g}{g(1-g)} g_{K_i} \right] \leq 0, \text{ for } g \geq 1/2 \\
g_{H_i H_c} &= g_{H_i} \left[\frac{1-2g}{g(1-g)} g_{H_c} \right] \geq 0, \text{ for } g \geq 1/2. \\
g_{H_i H_i} &= g_{H_i} \left[\frac{1-2g}{g(1-g)} g_{H_i} - \frac{p\pi v(H_i)(1-1/\varepsilon_i)}{\bar{e}_i + p\pi v(H_i)H_i - K_i} \right. \\
&\quad \left. + \frac{2p\pi v'(H_i) + p\pi H_i v''(H_i)}{p\pi v(H_i)(1-1/\varepsilon_i)} \right] < 0, \text{ for } g \geq 1/2, v'' \leq 0. \\
g_{pp} &= g_p \left[\frac{1-2g}{g(1-g)} g_p + \frac{\pi v(H_c)H_c[\bar{e}_i - K_i] - \pi v(H_i)H_i[\bar{e}_c - K_c]}{[\bar{e}_c + (1-p)\pi v(H_c)H_c - K_c][\bar{e}_i + p\pi v(H_i)H_i - K_i]} \right]. \\
g_{p K_i} &= g_p \left[\frac{1-2g}{g(1-g)} g_{K_i} + \frac{1}{\bar{e}_i + p\pi v(H_i)H_i - K_i} \right] > 0, \text{ for } g \geq 1/2.
\end{aligned}$$

The conditions given suffice to sign all terms but g_{pp} . The first term of the square bracketed expression in g_{pp} is negative for $g > 1/2$. The second term is ambiguous. Hereafter we will assume that $g_{pp} < 0$.

Taking all the second derivative expressions and using the first derivative signs we have shown

$$P_{H_i K_i} > 0, \text{ for } g > 1/2, g_p < 1, g_{pp} < 0, \bar{e}_i - K_i < 0.$$

The condition $g \geq 1/2$ basically requires that the incumbent have an advantage. The

other conditions are merely technical.

It can similarly be shown that

$$P_{H_c K_i} < 0, \text{ for } g > 1/2, g_p < 1, g_{pp} < 0, \bar{e}_c - K_c > 0.$$

These technical conditions are over-sufficient for the economically intuitive signs on the second derivatives of the reduced form probability function. The conditions imply that the marginal effect of own effort on election probability is increasing in own fixed cost and in rival's fixed cost (recalling that $1 - P$ is the challenger's election probability). The intuition comes from (A.1).

A rise in own fixed cost lowers own effort, all else equal, and for $\beta < 1$, the marginal effect of own effort on election probability is decreasing in own effort, $p_{e_i e_i} < 0$. Thus a rise in own fixed cost raises the marginal effect of own effort on election probability. The rise in rival's fixed cost lowers the rival's effort, all else equal. With $p \geq 1/2$, $p_{e_i e_c} > 0$, implying that the marginal benefit of own effort is lowered by a rise in rival's fixed cost.

Existence of interior Nash equilibrium—Symmetric candidates

With symmetric candidates and zero fixed costs an interior Nash equilibrium always exists. Existence is proved by showing that the first order conditions are satisfied at $H_i = H_c$,

$$\begin{aligned} \psi_{H_i}^i &= 0 = [W - \pi\Omega(H_i)]P_{H_i} - P(\cdot)\pi\Omega'(H_i) \\ \psi_{H_c}^c &= 0 = -[W - \pi\Gamma(H_c)]P_{H_c} - [1 - P(\cdot)]\pi\Gamma'(H_c). \end{aligned}$$

With symmetric candidates, the access cost function and the campaign cost function are common, so $\Omega(H) = \Gamma(H)$. At the symmetric equilibrium, $p = P(\cdot) = g(\cdot) = 1/2$ and

$P_{H_i} = -P_{H_c}$ based the properties of $P(\cdot)$ developed earlier in the Appendix. Therefore the equations are indeed satisfied at $H_i = H_c$. There is no guarantee, however, that the symmetric equilibrium is unique even with common access and campaign cost functions.

Strategic Complementarity

Strategic complementarity obtains if

$$\begin{aligned}\psi_{H_i H_c}^i &= [W - \pi\Omega]P_{H_i H_c} - \pi\Omega'P_{H_c} > 0, \\ \psi_{H_c H_i}^c &= -[W - \pi\Gamma]P_{H_i H_c} + \pi\Gamma'P_{H_i} > 0.\end{aligned}$$

Using the first order conditions we can rewrite these as

$$\begin{aligned}\psi_{H_i H_c}^i &= P\pi\Omega' \frac{P_{H_i H_c}}{P_{H_i}} - \pi\Omega'P_{H_c}, \\ \psi_{H_c H_i}^c &= -[1 - P]\pi\Gamma' \frac{P_{H_i H_c}}{P_{H_c}} + \pi\Gamma'P_{H_i}.\end{aligned}$$

Drawing on the derivations earlier in the Appendix we know that at the symmetric equilibrium we know that $P_{H_i H_c} = 0$ if $g = 1/2$ and $b_j \bar{e}_j - K_j = 0$, $j = i, c$. Strategic complementarity follows directly in this case.

However, these conditions are clearly over-sufficient. Recall that all second derivatives of g have terms in $1 - 2g$, so near the symmetric equilibrium $P_{H_i H_c}$ is close to zero. Therefore, near a symmetric equilibrium the second term will dominate and the contributions will be strategic complements.

Fixed cost asymmetry

The shifts in the best response functions needed to solve for the comparative static

derivatives are

$$\begin{aligned}\psi_{H_i K_j}^i &= [W - \pi\Omega(H_i)]P_{H_i K_j} - P_{K_j}\pi\Omega' \\ \psi_{H_c K_j}^c &= -[W - \pi\Gamma(H_c)]P_{H_c K_j} + P_{K_j}\pi\Gamma'.\end{aligned}$$

Earlier in the Appendix we have provided the conditions when

$$P_{K_i} < 0, \quad P_{K_c} > 0, \quad P_{H_i K_i} > 0, \quad P_{H_i K_j} < 0, \quad k \neq j.$$

These imply that $\psi_{H_k K_j}^k > 0$, $j = k$ while $\psi_{H_k K_j}^k \leq 0$, $j \neq k$. Since $D > 0$, own effects dominate cross effects in the matrix expression and therefore ordinarily $dH_j/dK_j > 0$, $j = i, c$. This can be guaranteed in the neighborhood of symmetric equilibrium.

In contrast, $dH_j/dK_k \geq 0$, $k \neq j$. In general, $dH_j/dK_k > 0$ when the absolute value of $\psi_{H_c K_j}^c$ is less than (greater than) $\psi_{H_i K_j}^i$ for $j = i$, ($j = c$). This can be guaranteed in the neighborhood of a symmetric equilibrium: $\psi_{H_c K_j}^c = -\psi_{H_i K_i}^i + S$; $S > 0$.

Even so, $dH_j/dK_k > 0$ requires that $\psi_{H_c K_j}^c$ be small. This indeed is the economically intuitive case—a rise in the incumbent’s fixed cost shifts the incumbent’s best response function upward, does not shift the challenger’s best response function by much, and thus induces both candidates to work harder. There is, however, a subtlety created by the dependence of p on effort while effort depends on p . The reduced form structure of P implies that the challenger’s best response function is also shifted by the rise in incumbent fixed cost and this can turn out to lower the challenger’s equilibrium H_c .

Utility

The effect on equilibrium utility of changes in the fixed cost of campaigning is given

(using the envelope theorem) by

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{d\psi^i}{dK_i} &= [W - \pi\Omega] \left(P_{K_i} + P_{H_c} \frac{dH_c}{dK_i} \right) = [W - \pi\Omega] \left[\frac{dP}{dK_i} \right]_{H_i^N} < 0, \\
\frac{d\psi^c}{dK_c} &= -[W - \pi\Gamma] \left[\frac{dP}{dK_c} \right]_{H_c^N} < 0 \\
\frac{d\psi^i}{dK_c} &= [W - \pi\Omega] \left[\frac{dP}{dK_c} \right]_{H_i^N} > 0 \\
\frac{d\psi^c}{dK_i} &= -[W - \pi\Gamma] \left[\frac{dP}{dK_i} \right]_{H_c^N} > 0.
\end{aligned}$$

The signs are assumed based on the common sense intuition that a rise in fixed cost should not raise the equilibrium probability of election:

$$\begin{aligned}
\left[\frac{dP}{dK_i} \right]_{H_i^N} &\equiv \frac{dP}{dK_i} = P_{K_i} + P_{H_c} \frac{dH_c}{dK_i} + P_{H_i} \frac{dH_i}{dK_i} > P_{K_i} + P_{H_c} \frac{dH_c}{dK_i} < 0 \\
-\left[\frac{dP}{dK_c} \right]_{H_c^N} &\equiv -\frac{dP}{dK_c} = -P_{K_c} - P_{H_c} \frac{dH_c}{dK_c} - P_{H_i} \frac{dH_i}{dK_c} > -P_{K_c} - P_{H_i} \frac{dH_i}{dK_c} < 0.
\end{aligned}$$

These signs can be guaranteed if $dH_c/dK_i > 0$ and $dH_i/dK_c > 0$ but should ordinarily obtain even if $dH_c/dK_i < 0$ and $dH_i/dK_c < 0$.

Figure 1





Figure 2

